Abstract:
The present contribution aims to test this understanding on the basis of an analysis of rights and obligations of third states in armed conflict. While the concept of third parties may be understood in a broad way as encompassing international organizations as well as non-state actors, the paper focuses on the role of third states because the protection of community interests in armed conflict is to a large extent an issue of law-enforcement by third states: The need for international solidarity through the collective action of third states is particularly tangible in cases of flagrant violations of the prohibition of the use of force. Where territory is illegally annexed, the state that is a victim of such an act will have to rely on the solidarity of third states lest the illegal act eventually be validated. Accordingly, the duty of non-recognition in cases of violations of the prohibition of the use of force developed simultaneously with the prohibition itself 8 and is well established in customary international law, 9 upheld by international courts and tribunals, 10 effects of Common Art. 1 GC I-IV with the effects of Art. 1 of the Genocide Convention. 21 Common
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is thus understood as laying down an erga omnes (partes)
obligation which is also included in customary international law.
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This categorization is considered to influence the way in which legal concepts and instruments promote community interests. Such interests can be furthered either by negative duties of 11 On the basis of the jus cogens/erga omnes character of Art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter and Art. 1 GC I-IV, rights and duties to take positive measures in the community interest have been promoted in legal discourse. Since the shift towards protecting community interests apparently requires some form of cooperation, positive rights and duties to protect and to promote appear to be indispensable.
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At the same time, authors relying on a community perspective often dismiss duties of abstention, in particular those enshrined in the law of neutrality, as an expression of indifference in the face of a violation of a fundamental norm of the international community. 24 Solidarity seems to require that third states take a more proactive role in actively enforcing community interests. 25 In contrast, traditional Westphalian international law is said to have established negative duties of abstention to realize its purpose "to keep States peacefully apart" in order to deal with the breakup of a community in the aftermath of the European period of religious wars. 26 For the purpose of guaranteeing the status quo by preventing war, it appeared sufficient to mutually respect each other's sovereignty and territory. 27 However, despite the perception that duties of abstention are closely related to the traditional Westphalian paradigm, this paper will argue that these duties can significantly contribute to the protection of community interests in international law. The basic aim of duties of abstention not to deepen or perpetuate the violation of such an interest but to further de-escalation forms a particularly important element in the overall protection or reestablishment of international peace in ongoing armed conflicts.
In order to argue that duties of abstention of third states are a central instrument for promoting community interests in relation to armed conflicts, the paper will first trace pertinent structural changes in international law. In particular, it will question the extent to which positive rights and obligations of third states have been firmly established in international law (Part II). In a second step, this contribution will evaluate the overall tendencies in the ongoing lawmaking process for promoting community interests in relation to armed conflict (Part III).
Community interest and law-enforcement: Positive obligations instead of duties of abstention?
Pertinent rights and obligations of third states stem not only from the general rules of state responsibility in cases of grave breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a "This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article , paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached." 41 Tams . 66 Yet it is disputed whether Common Art. 1 GC I-IV includes such a right or duty to take countermeasures. 67 Indeed, there are no indications in state practice that Art. 1 GC I-IV is conceived in a broader way than the general rules on state responsibility in this respect. Still, the provision goes considerably further than these rules in that it is not confined to a serious violation of a peremptory norm but might relate to any breach of the Conventions. 
c) Duties of abstention
Admittedly, third states' duties of abstention might only be a relevant instrument for furthering community interests in jus ad bellum and jus in bello because these rules deal with sovereignty and inter-state relations. Therefore, they are still seen as a part of the traditional bilateral law of coordination. 73 However, in a decentralized order legally coordinated duties can work as a functional equivalent for an institutionalized collective security system. The parallel compliance of states with precisely determined duties of abstention serves community interests 74 probably even better than broad margins of discretion. Thus, automatic duties of abstention for third states in the law of neutrality 75 can be seen as a way of realizing community interests in a traditional form.
Duties of abstention as a means to protect community interests under traditional aa) international law
Before the First World War, the law of neutrality had developed such automatic duties of abstention for third parties in armed conflicts: While the neutral state bore a duty of nonparticipation and impartiality, it had the corollary right not to be adversely affected by the conflict. The duty of nonparticipation required the neutral state not to render any assistance to a belligerent party and forbade the treatment of belligerents in an unjustified differential manner. 76 In a war, the duties under the Hague Conventions V and VII and under customary international law were automatically applicable. 77 Therefore, the law of neutrality expressed the idea that war legally concerns all states and not only the belligerent parties. 78 It departed from the traditional bilateral paradigm in that the legal relationship was not confined to the belligerents. Instead war brought about a new legal relationship for neutral third states 79 and became a separate legal regime. For the automatic and parallel application of the rules, certain basic procedures were established, such as the duty to notify third states about the outbreak of a war. 80 Accordingly, an important aspect of rendering peace a community interest is already embodied in the law of neutrality in that it is meant to promote international stability and security. 81 Whereas this legal regime also serves to protect the vital self-interests of belligerents 82 as well as of neutral states, 83 it first and foremost fulfills "a conflict restraining function." 84 It draws a distinction between neutral states and belligerents, promotes abstention, furthers impartiality, and thus aims to stop the conflict from escalating and spreading. 85 The law of neutrality apparently contributed to a certain stability in the international relations of that period because states did not have to fear being pulled into conflicts.
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Modifying duties of abstention bb)
The goal of protecting community interests has not only promoted more or less successful efforts to establish positive rights and obligations in international law, but it has also modified preexisting duties of abstention. Whereas institutionalization and collectivization have prompted structural changes within existing legal regimes modifying the law of neutrality under the UN Charter, the peremptory effect of the prohibition on the use of force has influenced the standards of responsibility.
While it is generally acknowledged that a state can still declare its neutrality under the UN Charter, 87 the system of collective security restricts this discretion in the interest of international peace and security at least in two ways: the duty to comply with a sanction regime imposed by the In relation to the rules on the use of force, its peremptory nature has promoted stricter standards of responsibility than third-party duties under the more general standards of the law of state responsibility. As a primary law rule, there is a particularly strict standard for a duty of abstention included in Art. 3 lit. f of the 1974 Definition of Aggression which provides for an objective standard of responsibility and does not require any subjective element on the side of the third state. 93 It will therefore qualify as an act of aggression if a state allows its territory "which it has placed at the 85 violation of the use of force or prohibition of aggression will not go unnoticed and will be subject to widespread assessments of its lawfulness, it is also conceivable that the character of the prohibition as embodying a community interest promotes the stricter standard. 97 In particular, in traditional cases of the violation of the use of force where territorial acquisition is involved, the rationale behind such a modification of standards aims at preventing any form of prescription through acquiescence lest legal effects be accorded to an illegal act of particular gravity.
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Common Art. 1 GC I-IV as an autonomous primary obligation also entails stricter standards of responsibility than the secondary rules on state responsibility under Art. 16 ASR, insofar as a mere encouragement of violations of international humanitarian law is sufficient to violate the rule, while in general international law incitement or encouragement does not entail responsibility. 99 According to some views in the literature and according to the ICRC, the requirement of a subjective element is also modified. 100 The argument is based on the wording of Common Art. 1 GC I-IV: the states parties have subscribed to a more specific and thus stricter legal duty to ensure respect, inter alia, by using the word "undertake." On the basis of the 2007 ICJ Genocide case, 101 the word "to undertake" is considered to be "not merely hortatory and purposive." 
Tendencies of erosion cc)
Moreover, duties of abstention are not necessarily an expression of indifference and sovereigntybased understandings of non-interference, but help to protect peace by aiming to contain war and its effects in a decentralized system: the violation of the prohibition on the use of force or violations of international humanitarian law may be subject to widespread assessments of their lawfulness. Nonetheless, there may be significant disagreement about legally permissible justifications or about legal attribution of the wrongful act. Conflicting community interests may have to be balanced and the prioritization of one community interest over another may be abused or might appear to be abused for covering more self-interested policy aims. In particular, in noninternational armed conflict, the risk of abuse by intervening states is high where military aid is given to rebels which aim to overthrow a government. 103 Moreover, empirical research suggests that support for all sides of an armed conflict prolongs the conflict. 104 An important duty of abstention stipulates that third states must not supply arms to rebel groups.
This duty has been stated in the ICJ's Nicaragua Judgment 105 and the Armed Activities Case 106 as well as in the Friendly Relations Declaration. 107 Such an arms transfer violates both the prohibition on the use of force and the duty of non-intervention. 108 Moreover, Common Art. 1 GC I-IV prohibits the transfer of weapons to state parties or armed groups, which have violated international humanitarian law. as well as France, the UK, the U.S. and probably Croatia have delivered weapons to armed opposition groups which have reportedly violated international humanitarian law. 112 Also, the EU at
The strong call for protecting the individual in R2P situations, such as in Libya or Syria, seems to push governments to send weapons to armed opposition groups, thereby eroding well established rules on the prohibition on the use of force and non-intervention. For instance, the French supply of weapons to Libyan opposition groups was politically justified as a means of protecting civilians. 119 British and U.S. justifications also relied on civilian protection. 120 After diplomatic pressure from the UK and France, the EU amended its blanket EU arms embargo to all parties to the conflict in Syria and justified its activities by the intent to enable protection of civilians.
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Of course, the mere violation of a customary international law rule, let alone a treaty rule, does not per se trigger its derogation, but if there is a scarcity of state protests, a negligent attitude by states can potentially lead to a modification of applicable customary international law rules on the basis of acquiescence. 122 In the Syrian conflict, at least, Austria voiced concern 123 and there was strong protest from Russia, 124 but criticism is mainly articulated by academia and NGOs. 125 While it would be too early to draw the conclusion that the pertinent prohibitions have fallen into desuetude, 126 the example demonstrates that disagreements about the prioritization of community interests (peace through containment of conflicts v. human rights protection by civilian protection) threaten to undermine well established duties of abstention. What might appear to be a sound political compromise could also turn out to bear considerable adverse effects. In a multipolar world, Western states should only engage in norm dilution of duties of abstention if they are prepared to accept that other powers will support rebels in other civil wars according to their political preferences or perceptions of a hierarchy of community interests.
Community interests and the progressive development of third-party rights and duties in armed conflict
Strictly speaking, the lawmaking process on third-party rights and duties has stagnated. While duties of abstention, above all the duty of non-recognition and non-assistance, are well established, more far-reaching rights and duties to take positive measures are still tentative or at least disputed. Priority shifts even suggest tendencies of regression. There is still a dearth of conclusive state practice and only few decisions of the ICJ or other international tribunals exist. As long as states remain too reluctant or too cautious to defend community interests by instituting legal proceedings on armed conflicts before international courts, 127 their competence to do so will be disputed and it is unlikely that further positive obligations of third states will be developed.
What are the reasons for the lack of a more decisive development of the law in the community interest?
a) Competing guardians of community interests: States, the ICJ and the ICRC
Given that the ICJ has fostered the erga omnes concept in the Barcelona Traction case and described the "outlawing of acts of aggression" as an example of erga omnes obligations, 128 many authors expect the court to act as a decisive guardian of community interests also in the realm of armed conflict. After all, the ICJ is -so far -the only or at least the most important court to judge on issues of jus ad bellum and jus in bello alike. Yet the Court appears to act very cautiously in cases concerning armed conflicts. It has so far not explicitly 129 determined the jus cogens the Geneva Conventions. 141 Still, it did not make any pronouncement on the scope of the obligations involved. The Court apparently left this task to the political organs of the UN:
Finally, the Court is of the view that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion. Moreover, international humanitarian law is not only directed at protecting a community interest but also regulates fundamental security interests of states. 146 However, the guardian function of the ICRC seems to promote law-development in the public interest. take. 154 Such a margin leaves room for vital policy considerations. In situations of armed conflict, diverging community interests as well as relevant national interests will have to be balanced against one another. The Syrian example demonstrates the adverse effects that a balancing exercise between efforts to provide for civilian protection and efforts to prevent the escalation and perpetuation of an armed conflict can provoke. Escalation of conflicts, prospects and progress of negotiations and peace deals, and the political symbolism of taking countermeasures against any particular actor are among the interests to be considered. Such interests do not reflect individual "selfish" interests of states but are themselves more or less directly related to the community interests involved. Taking measures which are not effective will in general imply higher political costs than complying with a duty of abstention. 155 In cases concerning the use of force, states will be reluctant to bring their allies before an international court and it is highly unlikely that they will use non-forcible countermeasures against them. Thus, while the legality of U.S. unilateralism in 
Unilateralism and positive duties in a changing global order
The idea of decentralized enforcement of community interests gained strong momentum after the adoption of the Articles of State Responsibility contemporaneously with the heyday of the R2P
debate. Both concepts -R2P and non-forcible rights and duties to protect community interestsshare structural parallels. 159 The risk implied in countermeasures was framed in terms of finding the right balance between the "effective protection of community values and the need to prevent closely linked to an American-led liberal international system 161 because it concerned a balancing exercise between enforcement of a liberal perception of community interests and the dangers of power abuse in a unipolar world order. Not without reason, Western states were seen as being the major proponents of a right to take countermeasures. However, in that period Western states apparently did not manage to establish what standards of legality and legitimacy apply regarding such actions. 162 Of course, one might read the continuing debates as "witness to the slow establishment of the concept of community." 163 But in an alternative reading, the push for unilateral ways to prioritize humanitarian community interests over more sovereign-related ones has contributed to undermining existing rules, while new rules have not been able to evolve with sufficient clarity. Recent tendencies of erosion of the duty not to support rebels, for instance, are not matched by a rise of well-established new rules for deciding how to prioritize conflicting community interests in the face of ongoing armed conflicts. Such a development contributes to an increase of normative uncertainty in the regime on the use of force 164 and thus to a perception of crisis or even failure. 165 In contrast, duties of abstention further community interests by aiming to contain the effects of a violation of such a rule. An approach emphasizing duties of abstention is informed by the idea that immediate reactions to wrongful acts by abstention might help to prevent escalation of conflicts at an early stage 166 -a stage where according to empirical studies third-party intervention in noninternational armed conflicts tends to prolong the duration of the conflict. 167 The involvement of third states increases the complexity of conflicts and will thus make any peaceful solution even more difficult to attain. Especially in view of the interrelatedness of states in a globalized world, duties of abstention can be an efficient means. Abstaining from certain interactions will affect perpetrating states more severely than it did in previous times. 168 A way forward for promoting community interests through third-party obligations might thus lie in refocusing on de-escalation through the more traditional means of containing war: duties of neutrality, abstention and nonintervention for third states. 
